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Budget support is a form of macro-economic finan-
cial assistance that is designed to prioritise the
fight against poverty and the achievement of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).The
European Commission (EC) is providing more and
more budget support under the Cotonou
Partnership Agreement (CPA), which structures the
provision of assistance by the European Union (EU)
to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) coun-
tries.The EC also provides macro-economic support
through its cooperation agreements with a number
of non-ACP countries, for which it is now also intro-
ducing budget support.
During the course of its work in the ACP regions,
the European Centre for Development Policy
Management (ECDPM) was approached by parlia-
mentarians, representatives of non-governmental
organisations and partner government officials, all
of whom had certain questions to ask about the
background to and operation of budget support.
These actors regard budget support as an increas-
ingly important mechanism for development coop-
eration, and one that has potentially far-reaching
implications for their work. At the same time, it is a
relatively new mechanism, is poorly understood
and is driven by a relatively small group of experts
in aid agencies and partner country finance or plan-
ning ministries.
We have prepared this Discussion Paper in response
to these queries. Our aim is to give policy-makers
and practitioners in-depth information on the
nature and potential of, and the constraints associ-
ated with, budget support as a development coop-
eration modality.The paper explains the complex
nature of budget support and its implications for
the actors involved, as well as highlighting issues
that have a bearing on its success.
Budget support creates opportunities that are not
always fully appreciated by its critics. At the same
time, it creates risks which tend to be downplayed
by its supporters. Against this background, this
paper also aims to contribute to this intensely
debated issue by providing a balanced view for
those seeking to understand its complexities.
As this is intended to be a relatively brief paper, it is
limited to key policy issues and the challenges aris-
ing from recent experiences with budget support.
For this reason, we have not devoted much space to
discussing the issue of sector budget support.W e
advise the reader to consult the bibliography for
more detailed information on the practice and
technicalities of this rapidly evolving mechanism.
Finally, it is important to recognise that the move
towards budget support has aroused many ques-
tions among partner government officials, donor
agencies, consultants and academic institutes,
which tend to feed into the production of specialist
documents assessing approaches and experiences.
For this reason, this paper can do no more than to
describe the current state of a rapidly evolving
debate and practice.We hope to be able to follow
up this initial study and produce further publica-
tions on specific issues, tailored to the needs of
individual ACP audiences, as part of our future
work.
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vi1 Introduction
Budget support was introduced to international
development cooperation in the late 1990s.Its
appearance was part of a general reorientation of aid,
at a time when greater emphasis was placed on
poverty reduction.The key elements of this changing
policy agenda,which has now been espoused by
much of the donor community,including the EC,are:
(i) improved partnerships and increased owner-
ship through the delegation of more rights and
obligations to recipient countries;
(ii) the alignment of donor strategies and activi-
ties with the partner country's development
framework;and 
(iii) enhanced harmonisation of approaches and
procedures within the donor community and
with the partner countries.
Budget support was seen as a means of putting this
agenda into effect as it replaces costly,project-based
and highly fragmented aid practices with more effi-
cient and rapidly disbursable resource flows.The idea
was that partner countries should assume ownership
of resources,engage in meaningful public sector and
finance reforms,improve governance by creating 
better accountability mechanisms,and hence help 
to reduce poverty in the longer term.
The principles of the new policy agenda and the use
of budget support are written into the Cotonou
Partnership Agreement between the EU and the ACP
countries (CPA).The European Commission (EC) sees
budget support and the innovations which come with
it as a promising means of phasing out old-style
structural adjustment programmes based on condi-
tionalities.Where possible,the EC seeks to link the
provision of budget support to the implementation of
a country-owned Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS).
This implies a close dialogue with governments and
other donors to ensure that the EC's strategy and the
quality of its interaction are in line with the priorities
set by the partner country.
The EC has invested heavily in budget support (in
terms of conceptual understanding and training) in
recent years,and has marked it - where possible - as a
model for the future delivery of development cooper-
ation (EC 2003 [a]:9).In parallel with the World Bank
and DfID (UK),the EC has also made rapid progress in
terms of disbursements.
The issue of budget support has been controversial
within Europe,however.While many EU member
states agree with it in principle,there has been a
fierce dispute about its practical feasibility,with a
number of member states expressing concern that it
is being put into practice too rapidly.Other member
states disagree fundamentally with the principle of
budget support,on the grounds that it runs counter
to their practice of project support,direct control and
the visibility of assistance.The debate has been
intense within the European Parliament,which has
very little control over the funds disbursed under the
CPA.Budget support for the ACP countries originates
from the intergovernmental European Development
Fund (EDF),which is financed by the member states.
Contents of the paper
This paper starts out by briefly outlining the role
played by budget support in the context of macro-
economic stabilisation and poverty reduction,with
special emphasis on the provision of budget support
under the CPA.The third section of the paper discuss-
es the EC's policy on budget support.This discussion
is complemented with figures on the budget support
that has been programmed under the CPA to date.
Section four presents different views on EC budget
support,notably those of representatives of European
institutions and partner countries,speaking from
their experiences  .The final section summarises the
pros and cons of this new aid mechanism and dis-
cusses the extent to which EC budget support can
potentially contribute to intermediate outcomes,such
as country ownership and capacity development,and
to poverty reduction in the long term.
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context of the CPA 
2.1. A brief excursion into macro-economics
Economically speaking,budget support is a mecha-
nism for supporting the balance of payments of a
national economy.There is nothing new about
balance-of-payments support,however.After gaining
their independence,most ACP countries received
loans and grants from their former colonial govern-
ments and the international financial institutions
(IFIs), the IMF and the World Bank, to promote
(investments through) imports.Under the leadership
of the IFIs,balance-of-payments support was contin-
ued under the structural adjustment facilities creat-
ed in the 1980s.Several bilateral donors followed the
lead set by the IFIs and contributed to these facilities.
The transfer of funds was made conditional,how-
ever,on the adoption of drastic economic and institu-
tional reforms.Structural adjustment often lacked
any form of accountability,monitoring was relatively
weak and recipient governments' commitment to
policy reform was low.
As structural adjustment did not have the desired
impact on national development and poverty reduc-
tion, the donor community shifted its focus in the
1990s from financing and economic stabilisation
alone to poverty-oriented macro-economic support.
The EC followed this trend as of 1995,when it made
budget support,a specific form of programme aid
(see box 1),available to certain countries.1
Macro-economic support further evolved under the
CPA (2000-2005),which regulates the employment
of mechanisms for providing macro-economic finan-
cial assistance to the ACP economies.2
• One mechanism is the provision of balance-of-
payments support to allow for:
- external debt servicing through the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.
The rationale here is that the relief of debt
burdens will free up national resources for
investments in social development and eco-
nomic growth.A Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper (PRSP) is required for accessing the
scheme.
- external trade payments, through General
Import Programmes (the rationale being
that countries need to have import capaci-
ties to maintain economic growth);and 
- the balancing of short-term fluctuations in
export earnings from commodities to safe-
guard macro-economic and sectoral reforms
and policies.3
• Another mechanism is '(direct) budget support',
which should preferably be linked to the imple-
mentation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS)
for the country in question.It provides resources
either as a contribution to a country's national
budget through (non-earmarked) General Budget
Support,more recently also referred to as Poverty
Reduction Budget Support,or as Sector Budget
Support.The latter is ideally based on a sector-
wide approach (SWAp), through which donor
agencies pool funding for a particular sector or
cross-cutting issue,such as support for decentrali-
sation ('sector earmarking').4 Budget support
from the EC can also be 'earmarked' for the fund-
ing of specific types of expenditure.
While a large proportion of balance-of-payments
support consists of the provision of convertible 
currencies to augment imports or for debt servicing
purposes,budget support aims to finance state
expenditure in priority development sectors.The
qualitative monitoring of this financing process and
its outcomes is a key ingredient in this approach.
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Notes
1   Until the 7th EDF (1990-1995),support for structural
adjustment was provided primarily through General Import
Programmes,but was revised with the signing of Lomé IV
bis in 1995.Countries with convertible and freely
transferable currencies were then entitled to Direct Budget
Support,a change which was supported by the European
Court of Auditors in its 2001 report on the use of
counterpart funds.
2 In addition to financial aid,food is also provided as
programme aid.The latter is a form of indirect budget
supportand is provided either in kind or in the form of a
currency facility.It requires the justification of the use of
foreign exchange through import documents and a
counter-value fund in local currency.
3   This system of commodity support was set up under the
ACP-EU Lomé Conventions to mitigate the harmful
consequences to ACP producers of unstable agricultural
export earnings (STABEX) and income from the mining
sector (SYSMIN).Although the two systems were
discontinued when the CPA was agreed,the Convention still
provides financial envelopes to remedy the adverse effects
of unstable export earnings (in EC terminology,these
envelopes are now known as FLEX).
4   With regard to sector budget support,the donor
community uses different forms of 'earmarking'.Some
donors leave the use of sector funds to the discretion of the
sector ministry,based on a sector strategy setting out broad
objectives.Others earmark sector funds for specific
programmes or projects within a sector and keep a close eye
on spending.The shift in the nature of macro-economic support
from up-front conditionalities under structural
adjustment to the provision of negotiated budget
support accompanied a general tendency through-
out the second half of the 1990s for the development
community to refocus its efforts on poverty reduc-
tion.This shift in focus was also reflected by the con-
tents of the CPA,which contained three fundamental
innovations in this regard,namely:
(i) setting poverty reduction as a core objective;
(ii) underlining the need for ACP states to decide
on their development strategies;and 
(i) making the partnership all-inclusive by
extending it to non-state actors.
2.2. What does Cotonou say?
The legal basis for budget support is laid down in a
number of articles regulating development finance
cooperation between the EU and its ACP partners.5
In the light of the current European debate on the
suitability of budget support,it is worth taking a
closer look at the eligibility articles regulating the
nature and methods of financing.
Under Article 61 of the CPA,direct budgetary assis-
tance in support of macro-economic or sectoral
reforms may be granted if:
• public expenditure management is sufficiently
transparent,accountable and effective;
• well defined macro-economic or sectoral policies
established by the country itself and agreed to by
its main donors are in place;and
• public procurement is open and transparent.
Evidently, these conditions are hard to find in most
ACP countries and,if taken as absolute criteria,
would result in very few countries actually being eli-
gible for budget support.However, the CPA recognis-
es the importance of a process-oriented approach to
development.6 This is also reflected by the terms of
Article 67,on Structural Adjustment Support:
• Par 4:ACP states which undertake reform pro-
grammes that are acknowledged and supported at
least by the principal multilateral donors,or that
are agreed with such donors but not necessarily
financially supported by them,shall be treated as
having automatically satisfied the requirements
for adjustment assistance.
• Par 5:Structural adjustment support shall be
mobilised in a flexible manner and in the form of
sectoral and general import programmes or budg-
etary support.
Whilst the CPA does provide a legal basis for moving
ahead on budget support, the terminology used in
Article 61 (sufficiently transparent and well
defined…policies) does leave substantial room for
interpretation.
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Notes
5   Art.60,Scope of financing;Art.61,Nature of financing;
Art.66,Support for debt relief;Art.67,Structural
adjustment;Art.68,Support in cases of short-term
fluctuations in export earnings.
6   See,for example,Art.19 (1),Principles and objectives,and
Art.20,Approach,both of which recognise that
development is a long-term process which needs to be
promoted through reforms at different levels.2.3. Intended effects of budget support
From an economic point of view,budget support is
basically the same as structural adjustment.Both
forms of payment result in a stabilisation of a coun-
try's balance of payments.The difference between
them is the rationale for making the transfers.While
structural adjustment aims primarily at institutional
and economic reform,budget support is intended to
achieve much wider aims.The overall objective is
poverty reduction,which requires the instrument to
be linked to the recipient's wider development strat-
egy.7 The budget support arena may therefore be
described as a 'meeting place' for those advocating
development from a macro-economic perspective
and a development community which has tradition-
ally supported development from the bottom up.
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7  Budget support is also provided in the form of grants to
preserve countries' debt sustainability and to encourage
them to step up their public spending in social sectors in
order to meet their MDGs.Budget support seeks to tackle key problems emerg-
ing from past structural adjustment experience 
(see box 2) as well as from traditional development
cooperation,i.e. the uncoordinated provision of pro-
ject aid through a myriad of initiatives.In essence,
budget support is designed to achieve the following
aims:
• to link the provision of external funds to develop-
ment results.This underlines the importance of a
sharper focus on policy outcomes;
• to increase ownership by partner countries by
integrating external assistance into the national
budget.Budget support thus aims to link aid
more closely with local priorities;
• to improve public finance management.The pro-
vision of budget support is linked to progressive
improvements in this area,which are monitored
in relation to jointly agreed indicators;
• to develop coherent and comprehensive national
planning and budgeting processes allowing for
the rational allocation of resources between
investment and recurrent costs;
• to enhance government accountability.Budget
support requires regular reporting to national
stakeholders (parliament in particular,but also
civil society) and external partners;
• to increase the predictability of funding flows to
the recipient country,on condition that results are
achieved;
• to strengthen national systems for monitoring,
assessing and controlling the use of public funds,
in particular through public audit institutions;
• to improve the efficiency of aid by reducing trans-
action costs and through better coordination and
harmonisation of donor approaches.
3. EC budget support in 
practice
The trend towards budget support during the 1990s
was led by a number of donor agencies,who shared
a common vision for improving cooperation by ratio-
nalising the aid bureaucracy and by shifting the
responsibility for policy implementation into the
hands of the countries concerned.Their view was
that policy formulation and monitoring should ideal-
ly be undertaken jointly by partner countries and
donor agencies.The OECD supported this process,8
to which the EC actively contributed.The EC was one
of the first agencies to define its policy on budget
support.The Guidelines for Programming and
Implementing Budget Support in Third Countries
were adopted by the EC's external aid services in
2002.The EC has also defined a policy on the imple-
mentation of sector budget support,published in
2003.Both guidelines apply to all geographical areas
in which the EC operates and are tools for harmonis-
ing working methods among the various directorates
and agencies dealing with development in the EC.9
3.1. Approach,practice and challenges
While the EC's overall philosophy on budget support
is similar to the views of other donor agencies,10
there are certain differences in both approaches and
implementation practices.These stem from the con-
text in which donor agencies are required to operate,
notably the mechanisms for reporting to their con-
stituencies and controlling institutions.Without
going into technical detail, the description that
follows builds on experiences derived from the ACP
region (given that most of the EC's budget support
goes to this region).We have distinguished six key
aspects in this respect.
3.1.1.Provision of budget support
As spelled out in the CPA, the objective of budget
support is to contribute to macro-economic stability.
The latter is a prerequisite for sustainable growth,
the development of the private sector and the
growth of employment.In principle,budget support
is transferred directly to the recipient country's cen-
tral bank from where transfers are made - using the
Ministry of Finance's Treasury account as the sole
account - to other government institutions, the pri-
vate sector and NGOs.Budget support programmes
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5
Notes
8   See,for example,OECD/DAC.2001.Moving to Budget
Support,DCD/DAC/TFDP (2001) 11.
9   The following subsections are based on the two guidelines
and the EC note on budget support to the members of the
EDF Committee,30 March 2004.
10 See also Annex 1:Diagram of a budget support process.are multi-annual and generally last three years.
Funds are disbursed in the form of fixed and variable
tranches (see below).
In theory, the EC aims to provide untargeted budget
support.The rationale is that this will supply the
country's general budget with funds that can be
spent in accordance with local priorities,and agreed
upon up-front between the recipient government
and its financing partners.Monitoring and evalua-
tion are based on jointly agreed indicators for meas-
uring output and impact.While there is a clear logic
to this untargeted supply of resources for supporting
a country's macro-economic development,it is also
very ambitious.First,it may be supplied only to those
countries which fulfil the eligibility criteria (see Art.
67 of the CPA).Second,it assumes that the partner
government can be held accountable by its citizens 
- primarily through its parliament - and by donors.
Third,it presupposes that sufficient local capacity,
including systems and institutions,has been put in
place to cope with the complexities of budget sup-
port.Fourth,it assumes that the operations per-
formed by donors and the partner country are fully
harmonised,and that all donors use the same dis-
bursement procedures and common frameworks of
indicators and jointly agreed conditionalities.
Most ACP countries do not meet many of the eligibil-
ity criteria.For this reason, the provision of untarget-
ed transfers is one of the most keenly disputed
issues among the advocates and adversaries of
budget support.Where conditions are not conducive
to such support, the EC uses sector budget support
as an alternative to the traditional project approach
to bring about reforms within a particular sector,
region or thematic area.The promotion of sector
budget support might serve as an entry point for the
advancement of local (public sector) reform pro-
grammes.This could lead in the long run to the
country in question adopting wider institutional and
governance reforms,which in turn might permit a
move towards untargeted budget support.
3.1.2.Poverty orientation
At the end of the 1990s, the IFIs decided that nation-
ally owned poverty strategies should form the basis
for debt relief (a plan known as the HIPIC initiative,
see above),soft loans and credits.The aim was to
arrive at policies that would focus on economic
growth and poverty reduction.This focus was put
into effect with the introduction of the PRSP process
in 1999,which both the EC and most bilateral agen-
cies endorsed.This meant that the recipient partner
countries had to prepare a poverty reduction strategy
on their own - a well-intended but top-down process -
to stimulate 'ownership'.Some countries managed to
successfully integrate this approach with their own
development strategies - Uganda and Tanzania are
often cited as examples in this regard11 - while others
needed substantial support from the IFIs to prepare
the papers in question.Most countries have only
managed limited achievements in terms of civil-soci-
ety involvement in the anti-poverty planning and
monitoring process.All of this is threatening to turn
an approach aimed at 'ownership' once again into a
state of 'donorship',as critics observed after the com-
pletion of the first round of PRSPs (Oxfam 2004).
Today,PRSPs form the basis of development assis-
tance and soft loans, though they are still very much
under development.Most ACP countries are HIPC
countries and are required to formulate a PRSP,or at
least an initial PRSP, to qualify for debt relief.The EC's
acceptance of the PRSP process and the poverty 
orientation laid down in the CPA informs its policy of
providing budget support wherever this is feasible.
This type of funding of poverty reduction strategies
is also known as macro-economic support,general
budget support or poverty reduction budget support
in EC terminology.
While the donor community has introduced the PRSP
concept and endorses its logic of a country-based
strategy which needs to be supported from the out-
side,PRSPs have proved difficult to implement in
practical terms.
There are two main reasons for this.First,the aims,tar-
gets and performance indicators set out in a PRSP need
to be consistent with the country's annual budget.
A well-defined Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
(MTEF) needs to be put in place to bridge any gap.
Intense policy consultations need to be held between
the budget support suppliers and their partner coun-
tries to this end.Ideally,all the partners involved in the
provision of budget support should agree on a joint
budgetary process,including agreements on targets
and performance indicators.However,the practice of
dealing with and interpreting the latter in particular
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11   In Uganda,the PRSP process was built on the Ugandan
Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) formulated by the
Ugandan government prior to the preparation of the PRSP.
This is widely recognised as the reason for Uganda's PRSP
success.A similar,albeit less well developed,process took
place in Tanzania before the introduction of the PRSP
concept.differs from one donor to another.The EC is keen to
harmonise matters and seeks to draw its indicators and
targets from PRSPs and the annual reviews linked to
them.However,it follows its own line on public finance
management issues,which it feels are not properly
addressed by PRSPs.
A second difficulty is that the provision of budget
support needs to be aligned with the calendar for
the national budget process.Ideally, the annual
review of a PRS should form the starting point for an
exchange of views and for taking decisions on how
to prepare the budget for the coming year.But expe-
rience shows that timing is difficult,as the reviews
are regularly dependent on the calendar and require-
ments of individual donors than on the partner
country's budget cycle.
3.1.3.Result orientation and performance measuring
As mentioned above,budget support is intended to
promote economic growth and poverty reduction.
This is reflected by the EC's approach to measuring
performance and how this impacts on the transfer of
funds.In fact, the EC has developed an elaborate
measuring and monitoring system which differs
from the practice of other donors and emphasises
the EC's result-oriented approach.
EC budget support is released in the form of fixed
and variable tranches.Both feed into a country's PRS
or equivalent national strategies.The fixed tranche,
known as the 'all or nothing' component,is based on
the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF) review,which assesses whether general con-
ditions,such as a satisfactory macro-economic situa-
tion or any specific fiduciary requirements,are in
place.12 In principle, the EC does not undertake any
additional assessments and normally disburses
budget support immediately after the financing
agreement with the partner country has been
signed.13
The variable tranche is released gradually,depending
upon the progress made by the government in meet-
ing the agreed poverty reduction targets (EC:2004).
Where possible, targets are drawn from the PRSP and
measurement is usually based on 'outcome indica-
tors' in education and health.Tranches are also
released if targets for public finance management
are met.The EC is placing increasing emphasis on the
monitoring of PFM reform and has produced a set of
'efficiency' indicators in recent years,such as the reli-
ability and timeliness of funding for key basic servic-
es.These are currently being tested.
The EC aims to integrate its funding into the local
budget calendar and disburses variable tranches
after the annual PRSP review.Depending on the
assessment of poverty indicators,a payment is made
that reflects the country's success in meeting its pre-
set targets.14 The split between fixed,or conditional,
tranches and variable tranches is country-dependent.
The ratio in Uganda,for example,is around 50-50,
which is also a guide for other country operations.
Ratios of 70-30 also occur,however.Some practition-
ers claim that these are more realistic,as the targets
set for the variable tranche are often ambitious and
difficult to measure.
While the EC has adopted a fairly detailed approach,
the assessment of performance depends on the
quality of the indicators and therefore on the robust-
ness of statistical data.In many ACP and other low-
income countries,however,reliable data are difficult
to obtain.This makes monitoring a very demanding
and sometimes even arbitrary exercise for EC delega-
tions.Although staff have been 'deconcentrated' to
partner countries largely in order to improve opera-
tional capacities in the field for this very purpose, the
numbers may still not be  sufficient to follow macro-
economic and sector reform processes that are both
intense and highly complex.
3.1.4.Emphasis on public finance management (PFM)
The European Court of Auditors' special report no.
5/2001 recommended improving PFM as a top priori-
ty in order to improve the effectiveness of budget
support programmes.It made clear that improve-
ments in this area are not only prerequisites for
budget support,but a fundamental objective of
direct budget support.
Current procedures suggest that an in-depth diagno-
sis of the partner country's PFM situation,leading to
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12 Fiduciary requirements in relation to budget support call for
funds to be used by the trustee (here,the recipient
government) for the intended purposes.This includes the
need for proper management and accounting procedures,
and the achievement of value for money.
13 There is a degree of variation in practice across countries.
With the growing attention given to PFM,the EC has
adopted an ad hoc policy of making the disbursement of
the fixed tranche dependent on the partner country's PFM
being satisfactory.
14   In Tanzania,for example,the EC disburses the variable
tranche of the budget support in accordance with the
progress made as measured by the performance
assessment framework indicators (of which there are
around 60 in total).The score for each indicator varies
between 0 (no progress),0.5 (indicator missed,but good
progress) and 1 (indicator met).The overall disbursement is
the weighted sum of this assessment.a plan of action,should be undertaken.Countries can
qualify for budget support only if the diagnosis
shows that they are improving their PFM,a prerequi-
site which is not mentioned specifically by the CPA.
Delegations also need to report twice a year on the
PFM situation in the recipient country.An annual
assessment is also undertaken,based on:
(i) general public expenditure reviews,
(ii) reviews of the attainment of PFM 
performance indicator targets,
(iii) the findings of financial audits and tracking 
studies,or 
(iv) recommendations included in technical 
assistance programmes.
Ideally, this should be done by pursuing a dialogue
with the partner government, together with other
donors.However, this is a process that comes with
high transaction costs for both country officials and
delegation staff,and also requires staff at the dele-
gations to possess the appropriate skills.
As a complicating factor,donors do not agree on the
definition of an 'ideal' PFM.Individual donor agencies
use different assessment tools emphasising different
aspects of PFM.The results may lead to very different
policy decisions,with one donor agency moving
ahead with general budget support,and another
finding the situation too risky and going instead for
targeted (sector) support or even project support.To
overcome such inconsistencies, the EC and the World
Bank started a project known as the Public
Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) pro-
ject about three years ago.This is designed to stan-
dardise the assessment of countries' PFM systems,
and - once completed - should provide a common
basis for policy dialogue on PFM.15 
Thus,advances are being made in an area that is 
critical to the successful implementation of budget
support.But progress is slow,and requires continu-
ous learning on the part of the institutions involved.
Meanwhile,substantial amounts of resources are
flowing into the system.In fact, the approach adopt-
ed presupposes that the system can only be over-
hauled while in use.As one advocate formulated it,
'if you want to find a leak,you need to fill the system
with water.' This is an interesting analogy,in that the
question is whether it is possible to monitor all the
pipes in the system and hence whether water should
be introduced into the system at all,and if so,how
much water this should be.
3.1.5.Donor coordination,and donor-partner country 
coordination
The above underlines that the success of budget sup-
port depends greatly on the quality of interaction
between the various partners involved.Budget sup-
port resources entering into a system are fungible
(see Box 4,section 4) and can in the end only be initi-
ated,managed and monitored by means of a joint
approach that takes account of the big picture.
Coordination and alignment are easier if a partner
country can take a lead in guiding the partners.In
the absence of strong partner country leadership
(which can inform,orient and control the donor com-
munity),good coordination of the donor agencies is
essential.
Donor agencies that support budget support sub-
scribe to its principles but still try to bring in,where
possible,"their own" views,interpretations and con-
victions on how budget support needs to be provid-
ed.This becomes most evident in their approaches to
institutional and public financial management
assessments (as discussed above) and to monitoring,
in particular in the way they set and interpret indica-
tors.The EC is very much part of this process.
A solution to these problems may be lie in develop-
ing and formalising 'joint partnership frameworks'
between the government and its partners.The EC is
an active member of such partnership frameworks.
In the ACP region, there were budget support groups
involving different donors in ten countries in 2004;16
their task was to outline basic principles and process-
es and to define a framework for performance
assessment.The principle of a joint framework is
explained in Box 3 (which takes the Tanzanian initia-
tive as an example),and provides a glimpse of the
complexities involved in moving towards coordina-
tion and harmonisation (based on information from
EC 2004,and Daima and ODI 2004).
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15 The initiative has now evolved into a partnership between
the World Bank,the EC,the UK,France,Switzerland,Norway,
the IMF and the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA).
16   Benin,Burkina Faso,Ethiopia,Ghana,Malawi,Mozambique,
Rwanda,Senegal,Tanzania and Uganda.Box 3:Donor-government coordination in Tanzania
Since September 2004, the Poverty Reduction
Budget Support (PRBS) Group in Tanzania has been
made up of 14 members: the African Development
Bank,Canada,Denmark, the EC,Finland,Germany,
Ireland,Japan, the Netherlands,Norway,Sweden,
Switzerland, the UK and the World Bank.It was 
formalised in its current form under a Partnership
Framework agreed in 2002.The government of
Tanzania asked for all budget support to be provid-
ed through the PRBS.In 2004,PRBS together with
the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Support Credit
(PRSC) accounted for 25% of aggregate aid.It is
delivered as direct,non-targeted budget support.
The Partnership Framework describes the process
and a Performance Assessment Framework (PAF)
sets out the agreed policies and expected actions.
These are assessed in a six-monthly joint review.
A number of Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) indi-
cators (related to the Millennium Development
Goals) which were added to the PAF are still under
discussion.The PAF focuses primarily on PFM and
macro-economic issues.But the link to poverty
reduction is gradually growing as the PRS indi-
cators are introduced,and views from the World
Bank's PRSC,namely in relation to considering
progress on rural development,are included.
Work is still very much in progress.The PRBS needs
to be aligned more closely with the review of
Tanzania's PRS and linked with the government's
budget preparation process if the gaps between 
the PRBS and the PRS are to be bridged.Moreover,
the decision-making mechanism of the PRBS
reviews has not been formalised,and individual
financing agreements take precedence over the
Partnership Framework.This is a potential cause of
problems.
3.1.6.Capacity development
Obviously, there is a huge capacity agenda linked to
the issue of budget support.Capacity improvements
need to take place within donor agencies - both at
headquarters and in the field - and between donor
agencies and within partner countries.
The EC recognises this and places considerable
stress on the need to build and strengthen capaci-
ties for the planning, management and control of
budget support and sector reform activities.These
include:
• support for public finance and information sys-
tems;
• building capacities for budget programming;
• strengthening internal and external audit capaci-
ties and institutions,including parliamentary con-
trol and surveys;and 
• technical support for line ministries aimed at
enhancing their ability to link sector policies with
macro-economic planning and budgeting.
The EC also supports national statistical and moni-
toring institutions.There are plans to use between
5% and 10% of the funds available for budget sup-
port for capacity development.So far,no data are
available showing that this ambitious target is being
met.
Although the EC has initiated intensive training in
budget support for its headquarters and field staff,
more needs to be done.The offices of the National
Authorising Officers,most of which are based in the
finance ministries of ACP countries,need to be fully
able to deal with budget support,as do other central
institutions of the recipient governments.Equally
important,however,is capacity development among
donor organisations,so that they can learn from
each other's approaches,harmonise their day-to-day
operations with governments,and overcome institu-
tional rivalries and competition.
Finally, there is a governance dimension to budget
support.As parliamentary control is often too weak,
civil society has a role to play to accompany the
process,for example by participating actively in gen-
eral or sector-specific poverty reviews.These need to
be seen as an inherent part of budget support as
funds are channelled to fuel PRS.Capacity develop-
ment efforts thus need to recognise the role that
non-state actors can play in a wider process of insti-
tutional reform.These actors should be equipped
with the knowledge and skills they need to take on
this role.
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3.2.1.Trend towards budget support
When the Lomé IV Convention entered into force in
1990, the European Community joined international
efforts under the leadership of the IFIs to restore eco-
nomic equilibrium and to contain or reduce external
debt in ACP countries.As of the 7th EDF (1990),it cre-
ated a structural adjustment facility for the payment
of General Import Programmes.As of the 8th  EDF
(1995), this was changed into direct budget support
for countries with convertible and freely transferable
currencies.
By the end of 2000, the Community had committed
€3,183m and disbursed €2,320m to 42 ACP states
through the structural adjustment facility (European
Court of Auditors,2001:4).Some ACP countries
received the lion's share of their EDF allocation
through this facility during the period from 1990 to
2000:Benin (60%),Burkina Faso (57%),Grenada
(55%) and Mauritania (50%) are cases in point.
Overall,some 30% of the 7th and 8th EDFs was dis-
bursed as structural adjustment grants,which meant
that a large amount of funds were made available
without being linked to intense policy dialogue and
donor coordination.However,only 24% of total assis-
tance to these 42 ACP countries was committed as
structural adjustment support,which implies that
actual disbursements through structural adjustment
support were higher than planned (idem:4 & 19).
Similar mechanisms were introduced for other
regions receiving EC external assistance.For instance,
between 1992 and 2000, the Commission committed
€955m to a structural adjustment facility under its
MEDA programme,which amounted to 37% of the
total funds available as EC assistance to the coun-
tries in question (idem:6).
3.2.2.Current EC budget support
The EC tested the use of budget support in Burkina
Faso and started using this new aid modality in vari-
ous ACP countries in 2001.The EC has stated that,as
regards the 9th EDF (with a total value of €13,800m),
around 30% of the country A envelopes - the total
country allocation minus a certain sum withheld to
cover unforeseen needs (B envelope) - has been ear-
marked as general budget support (EC 2004a:3).18 
Since budget support was introduced in 2001,a num-
ber of trends have taken place in terms of earmark-
ing,commitments and disbursements.As no compre-
hensive statistics are available, the figures can do no
more than provide a snapshot of a rapidly changing
situation:19 
• In March 2004, the total amount approved for
disbursements under ongoing budget support
programmes was close to €1,700m (i.e.some 11%
of the total value of the 9th EDF).
• A large fraction of these funds stems from previ-
ous EDFs (disbursements between 2001 and 2003
increased slightly from €318.3m (2001) to
€406.23m (2003) out of a total of €1,109.54m for
the whole period).Disbursements under the 9th
EDF did not start until 2003,which means that a
large portion of the 30% target set for the current
EDF has not yet been met.
• The largest recipients of EC aid in the form of
budget support until 2003 were Tanzania
(€131.4m),Mozambique (€136.6m) and Zambia 
(€ 109.6m),while the largest commitments for
this period were made to Mali (€164.66m),
Burkina Faso (€149.2m) and Tanzania (€190.13m).
Disbursements to some Francophone countries
have not grown as quickly as those made to East
and Southern African countries.Whether this is a
trend and whether this applies to all Francophone
countries is a matter that needs to be monitored.
• The countries receiving the largest shares of EDF
funds committed in CSPs to be disbursed through
budget support are the Democratic Republic of
Congo (65%),Burkina Faso and Ghana (55%) and
Mozambique (45-55%).
• All committed general budget support operations
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17  Quantitative information on budget support should be read
with care.Donors use different definitions and accounting
techniques and there is a great deal of confusion about the
distinction between general and sector budget support.IMF
tables on budget support,for instance,include data on
programme aid,which may in turn include aid flows that
are earmarked for specific sectors or even specific
expenditure programmes.Although EC statistics aim to
distinguish clearly between budget support and sector
budget support,not all statistics consulted for this paper
are consistent in this regard.The EC's operational practice is
even more complex.There is a tendency to describe as
budget support a number of cases which would perhaps be
better defined as programmes,because the two
designations imply different procedures,with the latter
being seen as more cumbersome than the former.Such
practice can speed up the release of funds and reduce
disbursement pressures.
18 The EC recently started to provide budget support to MEDA
countries.The EC is currently preparing a full overview of
budget support to various regions.This information was not
available,however,at the time this paper was written.The
provisions of the 1992 ALA regulation (443/92) do not
foresee the use of budget support.The provision of macro-
economic assistance is thus not built on a sound base of
policy dialogue and donor coordination.
19 The following figures are all based on EC 2004a:2-4,and
Annexes.fungible (see Box 4),as potentially corrupt because of
the limited scope of its control mechanisms,as leading
to the replacement of well-planned projects and pro-
grammes with massive and untargeted transfers,as
reducing the visibility of national cooperation efforts,
and as supporting the untying of aid.
Box 4: Fungibility - a problem inherent to budget
support?
In a way,all aid is fungible as support for specific
sectors or programmes does not automatically lead
to the partner country spending more on the same
activities.The empirical evidence suggests that tar-
geting aid on one (social) area results instead in the
government spending more on an area that is not
supported by donors.Only an intense policy dia-
logue between donors and the partner country can
result in a poverty-oriented budget allocation.
Fungibility is not necessarily a bad thing,as Foster
et al.note (2004).The government of Vietnam,for
example,asked donors to take on funding for big
infrastructure projects.This had the effect of releas-
ing government funds that could then be used for
reducing poverty and improving social indicators.
Such views are reflected in the criticisms voiced by
the European Parliament,which spring from a mix of
concerns.First,genuine concerns have been
expressed about the use of budget support,particu-
larly by representatives of Southern European coun-
tries and countries which are hesitant supporters of
budget support.Second, there is dissatisfaction
among members of the European Parliament about
the institutional context in which the EU funds
development cooperation.Budget support provided
under the CPA is channelled through the 9th EDF,
which is not part of the general Community budget
and is therefore not under the European Parliament's
control (the same was already true of the balance-of-
payments support provided under the 7th and 8th
EDF).The EDF is separately funded by member states,
covered by its own financial regulations and man-
aged by its own specific committee.22 This is a highly
controversial situation,as is illustrated by the ongo-
ing debate on 'budgetisation'.23 Budget support pro-
vided to non-ACP countries is controlled by the
European Parliament's Development and Budget
Control Committee (BCC).
contain an institutional and capacity-building ele-
ment of around 10%.No figures are available on
the implementation of this element.
In addition to general budget support, the European
Commission is currently implementing 11 sector
budget support programmes in ACP countries.These
are worth a total of €393m.20 Some of these sector
support programmes are treated similarly to general
budget support.Uganda,for example,receives
around €35m from the 8th EDF through budget sup-
port for the education sector.Although this is regis-
tered as sector budget support,it is treated as gener-
al budget support for operational purposes.21
4. Views on EC budget
support
4.1. European voices
4.1.1.Member states and the European Parliament
Budget support is a controversial topic among
European member states.Basically,there is a north-
south divide between those countries which favour
the use of budget support in principle (primarily the
UK,Ireland,the Scandinavian countries and Finland,
the Netherlands and Switzerland) and others who are
against it.The Southern Europeans are the fiercest
opponents,while countries such as Germany,France
and Belgium may be described as very cautious sup-
porters.Budget support has been the butt of consider-
able criticism,both from within Europe and from other
parts of the world,because it is perceived as being
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20 Sector budget support is relatively infrequent in ACP
countries,where only 11 out of 40 sector operations are
using budget support as a disbursement mechanism,
compared with 6 out of 21 in Asia,5 out of 12 in MEDA and 5
out of 5 in ALA countries.
21 All figures are based on EC 2004b:4-5,and Annexes.
22 The EDF Committee consists of experts from member
states,and is chaired by the European Commission.The
Committee takes no decisions,but votes to give a formal
opinion on each financing proposal.The European
Commission normally decides to go ahead after receiving a
positive opinion from the EDF Committee.If the Committee
votes to reject a financing proposal - which is a rarity - the
Commission can then submit the proposal to the European
Council.
23 This issue has nothing to do with the budget support
mechanism.'Budgetisation' refers to a situation in which
EDF funds are brought under the general Community
budget.The Commission has proposed discontinuing the
EDF after 2007 and making all aid to ACP countries subject
to mainstream cooperation instruments.The ACP countries
are fiercely opposed to such a move.See also Mackie et al.
(2004).The European Parliament's views on the risks of pro-
viding budget support were most strongly expressed
in its session of March 21 2003,in which it invited
'the Commission to keep the use of budget support to
a minimum until it has evidence that public finance
management in beneficiary countries is of such a
standard that the inherent risk of the budget support
approach has been considerably reduced' (European
Parliament,2003:14).The BCC again expressed its
concerns during a debate on 26 January 2004 on the
annual discharge of the Commission from its respon-
sibility for the management of the EDF.The BCC
called for further discussions with the EC on how to
improve the monitoring and evaluation of budget
support and sector budget support.
4.1.2.The European Court of Auditors
Whereas the European Parliament is relatively critical
of budget support, the European Court of Auditors
has given its support in principle to the shift from
old-style macro-financial assistance to budget sup-
port.Its Special Report no.5/ 2001 notes certain
weaknesses under the old structural adjustment sup-
port system in the targeting of budget expenditure
at poverty reduction, the allocation of funding, the
process and quality of auditing, the use of technical
assistance and the European Commission's internal
capacity for handling budget support.Against this
background, the Court stressed the need for the EC
to closely monitor the quality of public financial
management in partner countries,improve the vol-
ume and regularity of social sector expenditure,and
improve programmes in close coordination with all
parties concerned.The EC's policy on budget support
has been finalised and adopted in response to these
recommendations.
4.2. Peers and observers 
This section is limited to a number of key cross-cut-
ting observations on the practice of EC budget sup-
port derived from interviews,critical reports and
evaluations.Detailed views on individual country
operations are not included.
4.2.1.Investments in knowledge and learning
The EC plays a prominent role in advancing the prin-
ciple and use of budget support in the international
arena.While critical views have been expressed
about the speed of budget support for ACP countries,
the amounts involved and the way in which budget
support is monitored (including the use of indica-
tors),peers appreciate the substantial changes which
their colleagues from the EC have introduced and
promoted in recent years.As one of the first donors
to embrace this modality, the EC has produced
detailed guidelines on the programming and use of
general and sector budget support.The EC has also
combined the deconcentration of officials to country
delegations with an elaborate staff training package,
and is an active member of international expert
working groups addressing the problems,both con-
ceptual and operational,associated with budget sup-
port.It has been particularly keen to harmonise the
indicators for education and health.
The criticisms of budget support and the questions
raised about the extent to which it has actually
reduced poverty have encouraged donors to conduct
thorough reviews of its effects.The EC has built on
preparatory work financed by the DfID on the evalu-
ability of budget support (OPM/ODI,2002),which
aimed to assess:
• the extent to which a partner government can be
empowered in its relations with donors (in the
short term);
• how budget support can transform the quality of
governance (in the medium term);
• how budget support can enhance a government's
capacity to reduce poverty (in the medium to long
term);and  
• what its effects are on poverty reduction in the
long term.
Budget support is currently being evaluated in eight
selected countries,under the aegis of the OECD/DAC.
The review is backed by several donors providing
budget support,including the EC,and makes use of a
Joint Evaluation Framework.The findings are expect-
ed to be published in 2006.
4.2.2.Process versus results-based monitoring
The EC has a reputation for a strong result orienta-
tion.This is understandable,given the criticisms
expressed by the European institutions (see above).
The sharp focus on result-based management,how-
ever,is not shared by a number of other donor agen-
cies,who regard the EC as too rigid,inflexible and
not capable of adapting sufficiently to local circum-
stances.Doubts have also been raised about the
focus of performance monitoring (an issue which
applies to other donor agencies as well).An evalua-
tion of EC support for the education sector in ACP
countries notes that performance monitoring tends
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support for the education sector is assessed (Europe
Aid:2002).As a further point, the multi-dimensional
nature of poverty means that activities other than
health,education and PFM alone also need to be
monitored (Lehtinen:2002).
One of the main points raised by those favouring a
process orientation to performance monitoring24 is
the absence of reliable data for measuring results in
most low-income countries.Although organisations
responsible for collecting and synthesising data
receive institutional support, they are far from being
able to produce reliable statistical evidence.
Moreover,donors tend to overestimate partner coun-
tries' ability to exert any substantial influence over
changes.In fact,most countries receiving budget
support are in a transitional period.This means that
their ability to take initiatives,such as undertaking
what are sometimes difficult institutional change
processes that will enable budget support to be used
in the longer run,are of key importance and are
often the only way of 'measuring' change.It is often
unrealistic to expect them to achieve concrete
results within a short space of time.
The current donor thinking on budget support draws
heavily on experiences in Uganda,where the statisti-
cal data is of a higher quality than in other countries
in the same region.Uganda also enjoys a high level
of donor coordination under strong government
leadership - a situation in which different views on
results monitoring can be dealt with more construc-
tively.In the absence of such conditions,a result-
based approach is relatively impracticable and can
militate against joint coordination efforts.The EC
recognises these realities,and there are signs that it
is adopting a more flexible position in countries
where the situation does not permit otherwise.
Generally,however, the EC is reluctant to adopt such
an approach more broadly (see Box 5).
Box 5:Harmonisation in Practice (HIP)
Early in 2004,a number of HIP donors (i.e.Ireland,
the UK,Denmark,Sweden,Finland and the
Netherlands) agreed on the use of a standardised
Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA) for operations in
various countries.The aim of this initiative was to
agree on a common financing approach internation-
ally,but to leave sufficient flexibility to adapt to
country-specific conditions and the operational con-
cerns of individual donors.The template for the JFA
states that common goals need to be agreed up-
front before joint financing is provided;states how
to measure progress towards set goals;and shows
how donors can pursue a dialogue with govern-
ments.The template does not,however,specify the
type of indicators,an issue which is left to the
respective country MoUs.Finally,the HIP donors
agreed that country-specific exceptions to MoUs
(which might be needed for bilateral operations)
should not contradict the contents of the general
Template.The practicality of the JFA still needs to be
tested.Although the EC did not join the general HIP
initiative,it has adopted a policy of taking a case-by-
case decision on whether or not to join other donors
for specific countries.It has decided to sign up to the
MoU formulated by the HIP donors,other donors
and the government of Mozambique,and is partici-
pating in joint partnership framework initiatives in
10 partner countries (see section 3.1.5.above).
4.2.3.Public finance,regulations and capacities 
EC Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and Country
Strategy Evaluations on South Africa,Malawi and
Uganda provide some additional insights into the
potential and effectiveness of budget support.The
CSPs show that budget support is still in the plan-
ning stage in many countries.A move from structural
adjustment programmes towards poverty-oriented
budget support needs to be carefully planned,as a
number of CSPs have stressed.Country Strategy
Evaluations make clear that essential preconditions
need to be in place before budget support can be
provided.Expectations are often unrealistic and
overoptimistic.The CSE for Malawi states that this
financing mechanism is unlikely to be practicable
unless problems relating to fiscal stability and public
financial management are resolved.
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24 In this context,performance is understood as meaning
process outcomes,such as advances in policy formulation or
the constitution of new institutional mechanisms,as much
as hard outcomes.In South Africa,sector budget support appears to
becoming a favoured method for financing poverty
reduction activities.However, the evaluation states
that an overdose of rules and regulations imposed on
EC delegations is hampering effective implementa-
tion and preventing the adoption of harmonised pro-
cedures shared by all donors.Similarly, the CSE on
Uganda points to the extreme complexity of EC pro-
cedures as a factor that is preventing the successful
use of budget support.Whilst peers in the field
recognise that the EC has made substantial changes
to its operations,its bureaucracy is still perceived as
being too slow and cumbersome to enable it to keep
pace with other donors.
The EC is currently finalising the process of deconcen-
trating powers to partner country delegations.This is a
timely measure,as staff capacities need to be in place
to implement and monitor operations more closely.
The delegations will have a demanding agenda,as
they will need PFM capacities,detailed sector knowl-
edge,policy analysis skills,and facilitating and negoti-
ating skills.There is a risk,however,that the trend
towards budget support as the preferred modality and
the accompanying emphasis on PFM risks strengthen
capacities in an unbalanced manner.If macro-econom-
ic reform and poverty reduction both remain the aim,
as budget support postulates,the EC cannot disen-
gage from monitoring developments and processes at
sector and sub-sector levels.This requires the presence
of specialists,which is an issue that has not yet been
addressed by the deconcentration process.A large pro-
portion of new posts have been created for contract
management and finance staff at the delegations.
Only a small number of people have been recruited
who possess the expertise required to work on sub-
stantive aspects of development cooperation
(Frederiksen and Baser,2004).One solution might be
the delegation of monitoring responsibilities to other
donors.The CSE on Malawi notes,for example,that,if
budget support is adopted,the EC will have to rely on
lead donors in health and education monitoring
progress,since the EC delegation does not possess the
requisite sector knowledge and does not receive suffi-
cient support from its headquarters.
4.3. What partner countries say 
This section brings together partner country views on
budget support from a number of sources.Very few
systematic reviews have been conducted of partner
country views on budget support and their assess-
ments of its risks and opportunities.
4.3.1.A plea for budget support
The practical evidence suggests that a government's
decision to accept budget support from its partners
springs largely from the country's general economic
and poverty situation.Countries which go for budget
support are those which possess the weakest public
sector management capacities,and this causes
donors to focus their attention on accountability and
policy dialogue.If a country is less dependent on
budget support,it might choose to refrain from the
complex policy dialogue processes that come with
budget support and opt instead for targeted and less
'dialogue-intense' project assistance for areas in
which the government is unable to deliver.
The Tanzanian government has made a careful assess-
ment of the risks and opportunities associated with
general budget support.The President's statement to
the World Bank-chaired Coordination Group Meeting in
2001 and the 2002 Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS)
both make a clear choice in favour of joint action by
government and donors,the harmonisation of proce-
dures,the untying of aid and the pooling of resources
into 'basket funds' to be executed under government
leadership.According to Aarnes (2004),government
officials argue that only a move towards general budg-
et support can help to reduce transaction costs and
process overload,channel all resources into the budget
process and make it subject to parliamentary control.
This is an understandable claim,given the highly frag-
mented state of the aid apparatus,with over 50 cooper-
ation agencies undertaking over 1,000 missions and
asking for over 2,000 reports each year (WB 2004:207).
The advantages of budget support were also recog-
nised during the Strategic Partnership for Africa (SPA)
meeting held in Tunis in 2003.A survey held among
donors and the African partner countries on align-
ment,harmonisation and coordination with regard to
budget support presented a mixed picture.Partner
country representatives said they valued budget sup-
port because its untargeted nature allowed them to
make rational budget allocations between invest-
ment and recurrent costs,as well as between differ-
ent sectors.Project funding generally favours the
financing of investment costs linked to a specific sec-
tor,whereas operational costs - which cannot be
funded from national revenues - remain unfunded.
But the review also showed that the average level of
satisfaction with the progress made on alignment
was not very high.25While improvements in coordi-
nation have been noted, the steps taken towards
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25 The term 'alignment' refers to donors anchoring their
support in a developing country's objectives,priorities,and
policies,based on a consistent set of result indicators,and
aligned with the country's processes,systems,budget
cycles,etc.(definition taken from CIDA,2004 ).4.3.2.Conditionalities
The provision of budget support is accompanied by
an intense policy dialogue which normally goes
beyond strictly technical,administrative or logistical
aspects.Governance issues,such as the relative
absence of partner government spending on social
sectors while budgets for military spending are on
the rise,can bring sensitive political issues to the
table.There is a risk of a perception of donor intru-
sion and politicisation if there is no clear up-front
agreement among all partners about their respective
obligations and responsibilities,as well as about the
conditions and indicators they wish to use.The risk
of donors sliding into politicisation is particularly
high in countries where parliamentary and civic con-
trol is weak - which is the case in most countries
receiving budget support.A critical review of general
budget support in Tanzania,for example,states that
recipient officials - despite their general appreciation
of budget support - feel that the policy dialogue with
donors is 'intrusive' and increasingly linked to a polit-
ical agenda,beyond the technicalities of the budget
support mechanism (Frantz:2004).
Overall, the following pattern seems to emerge.Due
to the withdrawal of donors from the operational
side,partner countries acquire greater control over
the details of programming and project implementa-
tion,and this can enhance their ownership.At the
same time,however,countries lose some measure of
autonomy over the overall budget allocation process
because of the close involvement of donors through
dialogue and a certain push towards accepting and
executing wider reforms at the macro-level by the
partner government.
There are also worries that governments may
become subject to political pressures and leverage
exercised through joint donor approaches.This is
sometimes referred to as the risk of 'donors teaming
up',and is a realistic concern.In Kenya, the EC 
suspended the transfer of a €150m grant into the
government's treasury after the British High
Commissioner made allegations of corruption.27 In
Uganda,donors expressed their dissatisfaction with
the increase in funding for the military in 2004,and
the UK blocked €14.6m in 2003-04.The EC is contem-
plating cutting development assistance for the same
reason.28
The CPA envisages an ongoing process of political
dialogue between the EU and the respective partner
harmonisation and alignment have not led to a
reduction in transaction costs.The strengthening of
government capacities and systems,in particular
where PRS processes are young,needs to be priori-
tised (SPA:2004).These views are also supported by
National Authorising Officers (NAOs), though opin-
ions on budget support vary from one country to
another (see Box 6).26
Box 6:Points raised by NAOs on budget support
• NAOs identified budget support as one potential
way of speeding up EDF disbursements.They 
generally welcomed the more widespread use of
budget support.
• Experiences with direct budget support have
been mixed.Some countries feel that procedures
are too cumbersome,and that excessively strict
conditions are imposed.It will not be easy to
reach agreement on an MoU financing agree-
ment with the EC.
• Countries benefit from result-oriented budgeting,
including regular quarterly reviews and the publi-
cation of results.
• The existing tranche system,under which succes-
sive tranches may be disbursed only if positive
audit opinions and evaluation reports have been
issued on the preceding tranche,are vulnerable.
There are two reasons for this:(i) the cumber-
some nature of procedures,and (ii) the fact that
auditors and consultants are not always recruited
in good time.
• EC assistance should not be made subject to
other donors' rules and conditions.There have
been cases in which agreement has been reached
on projects to be financed by the EC,but where
these have subsequently been rejected in the
wake of objections raised by the World Bank.
• Procedures,rules and indicators should be har-
monised.
• There is a need to collect and share ACP countries'
experiences with direct budget support.
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26 From six regional workshops for NAOs,RAOs,non-state
actors and EC staff,organised by the ACP Secretariat in
Gabon,Ethiopia,Senegal,Surinam,Samoa and Botswana in
2004.
27 The Guardian Weekly,30 July to 5 August 2004.In
November 2004,the EDF Committee decided to unlock the
transfer under the strict condition that the Kenyan
government demonstrated a genuine commitment to
economic reform as defined in the Economic Recovery
Strategy and that there was an improvement in the
standard of public financial management (East African
Standard,27 November 2004).
28 European Voice,23 September 2004.governments.The most basic conditionalities are set
out in Art.9,which states that cooperation will not
take place unless essential elements,such as democ-
racy based on the rule of law and transparent and
accountable governance,are respected.The
Agreement also states that sustainable development
can be achieved only if these issues and others,such
as development policies,are pursued by the govern-
ment.If the political dialogue breaks down, there are
provisions for more formal consultations on the
application of the essential elements (Art.96 and 97).
This may lead to the EU imposing harsher conditions,
such as the suspension of a cooperation instrument,
for example budget support.
However,because budget support plays a prominent
role in macro-economic stabilisation,the threat of
freezing or even cancelling it gives donors a degree of
leverage that few other instruments can deliver.
Weaker partner countries such as Mozambique are
particularly fearful of such 'stop and go' tactics,as they
are affected most by the resulting unpredictability of
disbursements.The EC's policy of making payments
through a mix of fixed and variable tranches may be
seen as an attempt to reduce this tendency and to
increase predictability (the fixed portion is 'guaran-
teed' and is transferred as soon as the IMF-PRGF
assessment shows a green light;see section 3.1.3.).
4.3.3.Capacities
Partner countries are ill prepared to follow up on all
policy dialogue processes.First,many officials deal-
ing with budget support are technocrats with limited
influence over policy or for that matter political level.
Policy dialogue touching upon governance is beyond
the scope of their work.Second,many partner coun-
tries do not possess sufficient technical and dialogue
capacities for dealing with complex processes such
as budget support and sector budget support.This
results in a dialogue process that is poor in both
quality and effectiveness.
The CSE for Uganda points out that the conditions
set by the EC did not help to reduce poverty in any
significant way.The multiplicity of procedures and
conditionalities set by the EC did,however,divert
valuable government staff resources to cumbersome
bilateral discussions.Reviews and assessments
imposed bilaterally by the EC rather than jointly by
all donors of budget support placed a considerable
burden on the limited capacities of Ministry of
Finance officials (IDC/DS 2001:34).
Capacity strengthening is required both within and
beyond central government institutions.During vari-
ous parliamentary seminars in ACP countries co-
organised by the ECDPM,parliamentarians called for
more attention to be paid to governance and for the
legislature to be strengthened,in particular in the
area of institutional capacity development and infor-
mation provision (Corre,2004).As the EU increasing-
ly moves towards budget support, the governance of
this mechanism requires a balanced and well-
informed dialogue between the legislative and the
executive branches of government.Thus,parliaments
need to have access to the resources and knowledge
they need in order to perform their role properly.
A similar demand emerges from experiences of civic
monitoring of poverty processes.Civil-society repre-
sentatives who participate in poverty review process-
es need to be aware of the complexities of this aid
modality.It requires an improved capacity for policy
dialogue and a better understanding of macro-eco-
nomic mechanisms.
5. Thumbs up or down?
Budget support is a relatively new aid instrument
that could radically transform the way in which inter-
national development cooperation is delivered.
A judgement of whether budget support is useful
and effective can only be made once we have been
able to perform a more thorough analysis of the
experiences to date.The ongoing evaluation of budg-
et support is highly relevant and timely in this
regard.While it is too early to formulate conclusions
and recommendations,we will briefly list a number
of emerging lessons that guide current thinking on
this instrument.Specific comments on the EC's policy
on and use of budget support are highlighted where
appropriate.
5.1. Issues under discussion
Donor coordination: There is a consensus that the
introduction of budget support has encouraged
donor agencies to work together more closely,in
both conceptual and operational terms.The greatest
positive impact has been seen in those countries in
which a critical mass of like-minded agencies is gath-
ered under the leadership of the partner country's
government.Although the EC has consistently
sought to strengthen the ability of its headquarters
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support,it is not clear whether enough has been
done to meet the challenges.
Progress has generally been fragmentary,however,in
those partner countries in which there is no critical
mass of donor agencies in favour of budget support,
combined with a partner government that is either
unwilling or unable to implement budget support.
Progress has also been slow in fragile countries,and
in countries where the cooperation agenda is domi-
nated by political considerations or arguments relat-
ing to natural resources.In such countries,donor
agencies have much fewer opportunities to turn
what are often both corrupt and low-capacity 
governments towards a reform agenda of harmoni-
sation and alignment.
Harmonisation and alignment: The successful use of
budget support requires funds to be supplied on
time,in a predictable manner and in accordance with
the government's budget cycle.Ideally, the integra-
tion of external support into one government-led
public administration and governance system
requires donor agencies to stop favouring or using
their own systems and to align their policies and pro-
cedures with those of peers and governments.
Unfortunately, there is a long way to go before full
alignment is achieved.The SPA review showed,for
example, that some countries need to accept up to
10 different donor missions in order to get their pub-
lic finance management system assessed.
The review also revealed that donors ask virtually all
partner countries to report on performance indica-
tors which are not drawn from the PRSP (SPA:2004).
Work is very much in progress on this issue and mas-
sive efforts are being made to harmonise,as our
information on the 'joint partnership frameworks'
showed.The EC is an active partner in this process
and has taken the lead in defining harmonised indi-
cators for health and education.It favours making
maximum use of PRSPs as a starting point for its per-
formance indicators.Although this is logical enough
if budget support is to be linked to the poverty agen-
da,other donors have not yet followed the EC's
example.The EC is more reluctant to harmonise its
practice with other donors on approaches which
could risk undermining the EC's orientation towards
result-based monitoring.
Result-based management:Whilst neither donors nor
partner country governments dispute the impor-
tance of a focus on results, the lack of high-quality
data has led donors to adopt a range of different
approaches to date.The EC's view is that the differ-
ent 'camps' will move closer together over time,as
more and better statistics for monitoring poverty
become available.But it will take a long time to build
adequate professional and institutional capacities in
the partner countries so as to guarantee the regular
and timely production of reliable statistics.In the
eyes of some donors, this warrants adopting a
process-oriented approach for the time being instead
of a result-based approach to the monitoring of
budget support focusing on hard outcomes.The EC
does,however,offer a framework for monitoring
which donors who are presently critical of budget
support can join once factors such as statistics
improve.It has thus created a conceptual 'middle
ground' so that donors can potentially agree on a
common future approach.
Public finance management (PFM): Following the
publication of the European Court of Auditors' spe-
cial report no.5/2001,PFM became central to the EC's
policy on budget support.The report recommended
regarding PFM as a fundamental objective of the
provision of budget support,and not just a prerequi-
site.In the meantime,several donors have embraced
this logic.Despite this, there is still no broad consen-
sus on the definition of an 'ideal' form of PFM.The EC
regards this topic as being of key strategic impor-
tance,not only for the effective provision of budget
support,but also more widely for the partner coun-
try's development.This is illustrated by the fact that
the EC is the largest financial contributor to the
multi-donor PEFA Secretariat (see section 3.1.4.) for
the development of harmonised PFM assessments of
partner countries.
Enhancing government capacity to reduce poverty:
Initial experiences in Uganda and Tanzania suggest
that the new paradigm gives partner governments
greater latitude in which to take decisions on policy
issues and implementation.This has led to an
empowerment of government capacity to manage
the donor community and to take ownership of the
country's development strategy,in particular in fields
such as health and education.Budget support is pro-
vided on condition that financial management is
improved.This in turn helps to enhance government
capacity in planning and PFM.The extent to which
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capacity to reduce poverty remains to be seen,as
change processes last very long,possibly much
longer than many supporters of budget support
might expect.
Transaction costs: The principle of budget support
suggests that transaction costs can be substantially
reduced in the long term,which is why the EC con-
siders it one of the most efficient forms of interna-
tional cooperation.Experience to date has failed to
corroborate this.The replies of partner governments
provided for the SPA review suggest that harmonisa-
tion and alignment have not cut transaction costs
across the board.This is also the observation of
Killick (2004),who claims that the rhetoric on trans-
action costs is not sufficiently evidence-based.
Preliminary observations from partner countries sug-
gest instead that costs in partner countries are in any
event shifting towards the centre,mostly from indi-
vidual sectors to finance ministries.
Donor agencies also need to invest heavily in country
delegations to keep pace with a rapidly changing aid
environment.This requires different skills,notably 
in policy analysis and monitoring,PFM,facilitation,
networking and dialogue.But it will be difficult to
maintain the EC's decision to focus mainly on the
macro-economic level,given that the preliminary
experiences from delegations suggest that close
monitoring of processes at sector,intermediary (or
meso) and micro levels is required.There is a risk that
a focus on macro-economics and public finance man-
agement will simply overlook key vertical linkages
and horizontal developments.The need for a quali-
fied "poverty monitoring" at the EC's delegation level
is pressing.This requires investments in health and
education in particular,given the EC's strong focus
on developments in these sectors.More expertise in
the field to better understand and support cross-cut-
ting issues like governance,civil society and gender is
equally indispensable.
Mix of instruments: Critical observers of budget sup-
port point to the potential for misuse caused by an
uncontrolled supply of funds,and to the speed of
operations channelling substantial resources into ill-
prepared institutional settings.While these
observers recognise the general principle and the
potential positive aspects of budget support, they
have called for a more balanced approach involving a
mix of instruments,including project support for sec-
tors,local government and civil society in addition to
budget support.In the case of Tanzania,Frantz
argues,for example, that we should re-examine the
recent focus on central institutions and consider
using a range of mechanisms alongside each other
so as to meet the needs of different parts of society
(Frantz:2004).The downside to such an approach 
- as supporters of budget support point out (Aarnes:
2004) - is the absorption of scarce local capacities
into a still fragmented aid environment at the
expense of national government leadership.
Transforming accountability and governance: In 
theory,budget support can promote the use of new
accountability mechanisms,leading to improved 
governance.The payment of funds into the partner
country's Treasury should help to improve accounta-
bility within government.The finance ministry 
- which has to report to the outside world - has an
interest in seeing sector ministries getting results,
and sector ministries have an interest in ensuring
that sufficient funds are allocated on a regular basis.
A precondition,however,is that there must be a
transparent PFM system in place of an acceptable
international standard to support these institutional
interactions and negotiations.
The EC's decision to link the provision of budget sup-
port to the poverty process by drawing on indicators
formulated in PRSPs (insofar as is possible) is a move
in the right direction as regards accountability and
better governance.The approach assumes that annu-
al reviews of a country's PRS will create a mechanism
for reporting to the media and citizens,in addition to
presenting and debating the results of the poverty
reduction effort in parliament.
Obviously, there is a very long way to go in order to
build such a web of accountability relationships.
Annual PRS reviews are not performed systematical-
ly.Where they are,budget support is not aligned
closely enough with the PRS to allow for effective
monitoring.In addition,parliament and civil society
are generally lacking in capacity and are badly
informed,and often do not have the political weight
that is required in order to advocate more poverty-
oriented policies.Moreover,it is very unclear how
governance in partner countries will develop over
time.Budget support is likely to have a positive
impact on accountability and governance only in the
medium to long term,if at all.
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experiences with structural adjustment programmes
in the 1980s and 1990s, there is a general consensus
that conditionality - as practised in the past by the
World Bank and the IMF - will not lead to improved
policies.Together with a number of other donors, the
EC has called for an end to policy conditionality and
the adoption of a result-oriented approach,based on
the PRSP process.While this approach has the advan-
tage of being built on (intended) local poverty-reduc-
tion strategy formulation processes,instead of on
externally formulated policies,it needs to be accom-
panied by an effective policy dialogue between
donors and partner governments,as well as among
donors.This can easily lead to an increased upstream
involvement of the donor community in the policy-
making process.
Where policy dialogue fails,or where it is very diffi-
cult - as in the case of Kenya and Uganda (see sec-
tion 4.3.2.) - pressure can be exerted by freezing
budget support or switching it off.As regards the
relationships between the EC and ACP countries, the
CPA contains provisions for discussing political issues
such as the misappropriation of funds - the with-
holding of budget support being one of the instru-
ments to be deployed in response to a partner coun-
try's policy.The question remains,however,as to how
effective such measures can be,given a budget sup-
port policy which puts the ownership principle up
front.Before such measures are taken, they must be
clearly weighed against the risk of potentially losing
the partner in the process.
Another factor that makes this process so complex is
the donor community itself.Will evident misuse
result in a joint assessment and hence in the same
conclusions being drawn by all those involved in
budget support? The experience so far suggests that
very few donors have jumped ship,partly as a conse-
quence of peer pressure to go with the flow.But
there is no guarantee that all donors will speak with
one voice in all future situations.29
5.2. Final comments
So where does this discussion lead us? The principle
of budget support makes sense,as its underlying
philosophy is aimed at improving national accounta-
bility and strengthening democratic institutions.This
is a central element of the development strategy
expressed in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement,
which seeks to strengthen recipient countries' capa-
cities and ownership by means of the 'decentralised
management' of assistance.
The Agreement also provides a useful framework for
pursuing poverty-focused budget support.The spirit
of the CPA has been translated into the EC's policy of
result-based monitoring,which takes a locally devel-
oped PRSP as the basis for formulating indicators to
measure the effects of poverty-oriented budgeting.
The Agreement also underlines the importance of
the principles of partnership and all-inclusiveness,
which - as our discussion has shown - have yet to be
fully implemented in the context of budget support.
But they are recognised and feature on the EC's poli-
cy agenda.The CPA defines principles which the EC
can apply to the provision of budget support to other
countries as well,notably in Asia,Latin America and
the Mediterranean.
Without making any judgement about the merits of
budget support (the OECD/DAC evaluation referred
to in section 4.2.1.was undertaken for the precise
purpose of making recommendations in this
respect),we should like to make a number of obser-
vations about the relative position of the EC with
regard to the conceptualisation and implementation
of the budget support mechanism.
The EC is one of the prime movers behind this new
aid mechanism in the donor community.It has devel-
oped a sophisticated technical approach,in terms of
design,monitoring and mechanisms for triggering
the release of disbursements.The size of past and
present investments in the production of operational
guidelines and the development of harmonised indi-
cators in the context of Poverty Assessment
Frameworks is testimony to its resolve.The EC has
also underlined the importance of PFM throughout
its operations as of 2001.As such,it sets standards
for other donor agencies that can help to harmonise
donor policies and approaches.
Harmonising with other donors in the field remains a
tedious exercise, though.In countries where condi-
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29 This reduced freedom to take individual decisions could
induce donors who remain critical of budget support to
remain on the sidelines instead of joining in with
harmonised approaches - a situation which is not necessarily
undesirable.The question is whether fully harmonised
approaches and decision-making processes are indeed
appropriate.Taken to extremes,they could result in an all-or-
nothing disbursement decision for budget support -with
the risk of destabilising the country in question - or in full
disbursement irrespective of the country's performance.
There would no longer be any opportunities for individual
donors to signal their satisfaction or dissatisfaction.tions permit a result-based approach to monitoring -
which is of vital importance to the EC's approach on
budget support - the differences with other donors
are not clearly apparent.But where more flexible
approaches are required to monitor performance
based on process outputs and outcomes, the EC is
perceived as being a difficult partner to work with.
Attempts have been made to adopt a more flexible
stance in the field,but as the EC is closely 'watch-
dogged' by the European Court of Auditors,its space
to manoeuvre is limited.The same factor also
restricts the EC's freedom to ease sometimes exces-
sively strict rules and procedures and to align them
with the systems used in partner countries - a regu-
lar subject of criticism by partner country representa-
tives.
In terms of the magnitude of budget support, the EC
envisages disbursing some 30% of the 9th EDF in the
form of general budget support.This is a rather
ambitious figure,given the late start of disburse-
ments under the 9th EDF (in 2003) and the fact that
large amounts of budget support are earmarked for
countries which do not have satisfactory PFM sys-
tems and accountability mechanisms in place.
However, the sheer amount of the budget support
that the EC can mobilise for a partner country is so
great that it can direct a partner country's develop-
ment path towards reform.The strengthened EC del-
egations have stepped up their roles in this regard in
the past few years.
With the move towards budget support, the EC has
also restructured its organisation and operations and
strengthened its capacities in the field with the aid
of a massive deconcentration of staff.Preliminary
observations suggest that the results so far have
been mixed.While considerable efforts have gone
into the strengthening of financial and administra-
tive capacities,programmes in content areas which
are supported through (general or sector) budget
support - such as health,education,decentralisation
or support for civil society - cannot be fully moni-
tored due to the absence of sufficient numbers of
qualified staff.
So the EC is at the cutting edge in certain areas,but
still has a long way to go before achieving its ambi-
tious goal,namely,making budget support its main
aid mechanism.The EC is still testing the practical
use of budget support in many countries.The basic
picture is that things are moving in the right direc-
tion.Budget support can help governments achieve
their MDGs,as it can improve the channelling of aid.
It has evolved out of various fragmented aid
approaches adopted in the past which have not
worked.The goal in recent years has therefore been
to create a holistic and poverty-oriented develop-
ment framework for each country,bringing together
macro-economic and micro-economic development
approaches under the same umbrella, to assemble
the myriad of external donors under the leadership
of partner country governments,and to improve
accountability and governance.Basically,budget sup-
port should feed this process with funds so as to get
the machinery running.The EC is one of the main
funding partners for this process.
But these assumptions make the process of budget
support provision incredibly complex and long-last-
ing,and endow it with a potential for discouraging
the partners involved.It is certainly not a quick and
cheap disbursement mechanism.Budget support
leans heavily on policy analysis and to a certain
extent on planning.Moreover,it can create a control
culture with a potentially high political cost of policy
conditionality in the partner country.We therefore
need to ask whether it is manageable at all.There is
also a need for better analysis and understanding,as
well as for a constructive dialogue about what this
mechanism can and cannot achieve,where it is most
appropriate and where other mechanisms are better
suited.
This does not mean that the concept should be
rejected outright.Polarisation should be avoided.
Compared with other types of aid delivery,budget
support has its advantages and the risks and prob-
lems associated with it should be weighed against
the pros and cons of alternative instruments.
Moreover,it addresses fundamental problems,such
as PFM,which could not be solved in the past.The
above concerns are highlighted to indicate that
budget support is not a panacea and is not the only
solution in all settings in which the EC provides assis-
tance.The EC's strong focus on budget support and
sector support needs to be put into perspective,
however.30Without complementary measures,in
particular the removal of trade barriers and the pur-
suit of an improved international security agenda,a
poverty-oriented policy framework and budget sup-
port (including support for capacity development)
are unlikely to make a substantial difference to a
country's development.
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30 See,for example,Report back to Parliament on progress
made on commitments given to Parliament,
Speech/04/443,7 October 2004,by Poul Nielson,former
European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and
Development.Annex 1 - Diagram of a budget support process
An ideal form of budget support would be along the
following lines. 31
• Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) and
Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits (PRSC) meet-
ings identify pledges by development partners.
• Resources flow through the PRBS/PRSC process
into the national budget.
• The Mid-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) is
the main tool for coordinating and prioritising the
objectives formulated in the Poverty Reduction
Strategy (PRS) and the resources provided.
Resources are allocated to line ministries and 
sectors.
• The PRBS/PRSC semi-annual meeting is the 
principal place for the government and its 
development partners to discuss substantial
issues of the assistance along the issues featured
in the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF).
• The government and its development partners
meet in the Poverty Expenditure Review (PER) and
Macroeconomic policy dialogue and cooperation
group to cooperate technically on the basis of the
PRBS/ PRSC process.Technical assistance (TA) sup-
ports this process.
• PRS Sector Advisory Groups assist the line min-
istries to improve their planning and budget
process.TA supports this process.
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31 This is a rough outline reflecting the current efforts of the
government of Tanzania and its development partners to
bring all resources provided through budget support under
a single umbrella,guided by a common approach.Adapted
from Aarnes (2004).
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